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讲座预告 | 考虑社会责任的供应商集中度和审核优先级研究

发布时间:2021-01-04    来源:

讲座时间:1月7日(周四) 上午9:00




齐安焱(Anyan Qi)是美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校,纳文·金达尔管理学院副教授。2008年获清华大学信息科学与技术学院的自动化学士学位和经济学学士学位。2014年获美国密歇根大学罗斯商学院的技术和运营博士学位。2014年至今,加入纳文·金达尔管理学院。他目前的研究重点是现代供应链中的战略采购和产能管理。在他的研究中,他使用了随机动态编程,数据驱动的优化,博弈论和行为实验的工具。在管理类顶级期刊Operations Research、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management,近5年发表学术论文6篇。现任Production and Operations Management期刊的Senior Editor。


Most supply networks are characterized by firms that source from multiple suppliers and suppliers that serve multiple firms, thus resulting in suppliers who differ in their degree centrality, i.e., the number of firms they supply to. In such networks, any negative publicity from suppliers' noncompliance of socially responsible practices – e.g., employment of child labor, unsafe working conditions, and excessive pollution – can significantly damage the reputation of the buying firms. To mitigate this impact, firms preemptively audit suppliers, although resource and time considerations typically restrict the number of suppliers a firm can audit. Therefore, a key question is whether firms should prioritize the auditing of suppliers with low or high centrality, ceteris paribus. To investigate, we consider an assembly network consisting of two firms (buyers) and three suppliers – each firm has one independent supplier who uniquely supplies to that firm and one common supplier who supplies to both.

Using the game-theoretic analysis, we show that downstream competition between the firms drives them away from auditing the supplier with higher centrality; i.e., the common supplier, in equilibrium, despite the fact that auditing this supplier is better for the aggregate profit of the firms. We also show that this inefficiency is corrected when the firms cooperate (via a stable coalition) to jointly audit the suppliers and share the auditing cost in a fair manner. In addition, we identify conditions under which joint auditing improves social welfare.

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