ENGLISH | 加入收藏 | 设为首页
当前位置: 首页>新闻公告>学术活动

讲座预告 | Cooperative game approaches to coordinating a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns

发布时间:2019-11-15    来源:
讲座时间:2019年11月20日  9:00 - 11:30
讲座地点:25教学楼A座816教室25号教学楼A816教室25号教学楼A816教室25号教学楼A816教室25号教学楼A816教室
主讲人:李武教授



主讲人简介:

李武(Kevin W. Li)博士,加拿大温莎大学Odette商学院管理科学教授。1991年获厦门大学控制科学理学学士学位,1994年获厦门大学系统工程工学硕士学位,2003年获加拿大滑铁卢大学系统设计工程工学博士学位。2011年6月-12月和2015年5月-7月由日本学术振兴会(JSPS)外籍聘用研究员项目(Invitation Fellowship)资助到东京工业大学价值与决策科学系进行访问研究。

主要研究方向包括供应链管理、决策理论与方法以及冲突分析等。李武教授的研究获得三项加拿大自然科学与工程研究基金会发现基金项目的支持,同时也多次得到国家教育部春晖计划短期项目支持。

自2001年以来,在国际期刊如European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems等发表52篇学术论文,李武教授的研究工作得到国内外同行的广泛引用(SCI/SSCI累计引用1388次,h指数22;Google Scholar累计引用2457次,h指数28),一篇论文为ESI高被引论文,在相关领域产生了一定影响,现任《Group Decision and Negotiation》及多个国际期刊的Associate Editor或编委。


讲座内容:

This study investigates a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer. Cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic analyses are employed to characterize interactions among different parties. We focus on the impact of the retailer’s fairness concerns on different CLSC members’ decision under the decentralized and various cooperative models. Analytical results confirm the conventional wisdom: with the retailer’s fairness concerns, the channel profits under the decentralized and partial-coalition models underperform that under the centralized model. To find an appropriate profit allocation scheme to coordinate the supply chain system with fairness concerns, we resort to the cooperative game theory to maximize the channel profit and achieve a win-win scenario for all parties. To this end, we first compute the characteristic function based on the optimal profits under decentralized and different partial-coalition models. Subsequently, we propose three coordination mechanisms based on the Shapley value, nucleolus solution, and equal satisfaction. The three mechanisms are then evaluated by using numerical experiments. 
相关文章
地址:天津市南开区卫津路92号 | 邮编:300072
津ICP备05004358号 津教备0316号 天津大学管理与经济学部 版权所有