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讲座预告 | Platform Competition under Network Effects: Piggybacking and Optimal Subsidization

发布时间:2019-04-25    来源:




吴东军 (D. J. Wu) 博士是佐治亚理工大学Scheller商学院Scheller讲席教授 (创新、创业及商业化)、信息技术管理系终身教授及学科负责人 (Area Coordinator)。吴教授毕业于清华大学计算机系,在宾西法尼亚大学沃顿商学院获得博士学位。吴教授在软件创业的新兴商业模式、平台及生态系统、 网上拍卖、电子商务、开放式创新、云计算以及机器学习等领域均作出突出贡献。他在国际顶尖学术期刊上 (Management Science, Information Systems Research, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, MIS Quarterly) 发表多篇学术论文。他多次被邀请到世界顶尖大学进行学术讲座。他多次获得信息系统领域顶尖国际会议的最佳论文奖以及20132017年度Scheller商学院Byars杰出科研奖。吴教授现任国际顶尖学术期刊信息系统研究 (Information Systems Research) 高级编辑 (Senior Editor), 以及国际顶尖学术期刊管理科学 (Management Science) 副主编 (Associate Editor)

讲座内容:A repeated challenge in launching a two-sided market platform is how to solve the “chicken-and-egg" problem. The solution often suggested in the literature is subsidizing one side of the market to jumpstart adoption of the platform. In this paper, using a game-theoretic framework, we study piggybacking - importing users from external networks - as a new approach to launching platforms. Our finding suggests that optimal use of the piggybacking strategy depends on the cross-side network effects. First, benchmarked with the case of no piggybacking, we find that the pricing impacts of piggybacking is non-trivial. It may help mitigate or avoid price competition. Second, we show that platform duopoly with piggybacking can become a “game of chicken" or even a prisoner's dilemma, which implies that platforms are not always better off (sometimes even worse off) with piggybacking. Finally, when piggybacking users are fabricated (e.g., zombies or fake users), the platform strategies differ greatly from the authentic piggybacking case. It also undermines both the competing platform's prot and the providers' surpluses. Managerial implications for platform practitioners are also discussed.

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