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讲座预告 | 电商广告竞争中的约束性与柔性合约

发布时间:2018-12-11    来源:
讲座时间:1221日(周五)1000-1200

讲座地点:25C401

主讲人:刘登攀



主讲人简介:

刘登攀,清华大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程系教授(长聘)、博士生导师。现担任清华-哥伦比亚大学商务分析双硕士项目学术主任。2006年获得美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校管理科学(信息系统方向)博士学位。在2017年加入清华经管学院前,他在美国爱荷华州立大学(北美大学联盟AAU成员大学)商学院任终身副教授。刘登攀教授主要从事信息管理与信息系统领域的研究工作。他的学术论文发表于MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, Management Science, Production and Operations Management等国际顶级学术期刊。他现在担任国际顶级学术期刊Production and Operations ManagementUTD-24FT-50)的高级主编(Senior Editor)

讲座内容:

 

We use a differential games framework to study two modes of dynamic advertising competition, namely flexible (or feedback-loop) and committed (or open-loop), between two e-retailers that compete for traffic. In feedback-loop competition, the advertising contract allows firms to adjust their advertising levels during the advertising campaign. On the other hand, in open-loop competition, the contract requires the firms to commit upfront to an advertising plan (however, not necessarily one that advertises at a fixed rate). We ask the question: Which contract (flexible or committed) is better for the firms (advertising agent)? We find that the firms advertise less and earn higher profits under flexible contracts. As a result, the advertising agent earns less from the two firms under flexible contracts. Flexible and committed contracts become more interesting to study if operational considerations are included. These considerations arise from Information Technology (IT) costs incurred to process the traffic that arrives at the e-retailers’ websites. Operational considerations reduce the difference in advertising spending between the two contracts. Interestingly, to increase the revenue earned under flexible contracts, the advertising agent should offer such contracts at a price that is discounted relative to committed contracts. The discount exploits the force of competition and induces the firms to spend more on advertising. The optimal discount offered under a flexible contract reduces as the IT cost increases.

 

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