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讲座预告|“经济学系列讲座”第25期 Structural Manipulation in a Multi-period Sender-receiver Game

发布时间:2018-05-04    来源:

  主讲人:Hanjoon Michael Jung  台湾中央研究院经济研究所助理研究员



  主持:张中祥 天津大学马寅初经济学院院长、国家能源、环境和产业经济研究院院长



  Hanjoon Michael Jung received his Ph.D in economics from Department of Economics at the Pennsylvania State University. He is an assistant research fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica in Taiwan.  His primary fields of research and teaching are microeconomic theory, game theory, and industrial organization. His secondary field is political economy. His nine SSCI/EconLit publications appear in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economics Letters, etc.


  This paper shows how an informed politician can manipulate uninformed, yet rational, citizens in a multi-period sender-receiver game. By examining the payoff structure, the citizens find out that the politician has an incentive to be honest. Hence, they never doubt him and make their decision according to his messages. However, the information structure restricts the citizens’ ability to detect his misleading them, and so they cannot punish him properly. Therefore, under this game structure, the politician can mislead them without having significant disadvantages, and hence will manipulate their decision in his favor. 

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